

The Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy: The rationale behind the obstacles and prospects for the integration of the Commonwealth Caribbean

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Abstract

This study explores the rationale behind the hurdles preventing the full establishment of the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy. Very little scholarly research has been carried out on this topic, although some academics have pointed out the obstacles. This paper therefore seeks to understand what the real shortfalls are in the integrated entity, in order to overcome the deficiencies. Specifically, the study seeks to understand what constitutes the foundations of the lack of political will to overcome the issues of natural, financial and human resource insufficiency. This research utilises a symbolic interactionist framework, deploying qualitative interviews with forty-four CARICOM stakeholders, including senior government officials and businesspersons, and uses discourse analyses to analyse their narratives. The research findings suggest that the political will to counter the deficiencies is compromised by the national interests of each member state, which are affected by internal politics. However, what is hopeful is that the importance of the CSME is supported by member states. In this regard, what the CARICOM needs, is a fundamental reformation of CARICOM and the CSME governance, in order to provide technical support to the member states in timely manner. In the era of globalisation, the importance of the CSME is heightened, primarily for the survival of the member states.

1. Introduction

Delayed for years, the rationales behind the obstacles for the slow progress of economic integration in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), namely the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), have been neglected by scholars. The hurdles encountered, which have caused its delay, have been pointed out; however, the factors contributing to the formation of these obstacles have not yet been widely discussed. This study aims to contribute to the academic field of regional integration, specifically, West Indian integration.

CARICOM is originally a group of former British colonies in the Caribbean, which comprises of fifteen

member states: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago; and with the relatively recent addition of Haiti and Suriname. Established in 1973, CARICOM initiated the integration of its market and economy in 1989, in an attempt to combat and minimise the effects of globalisation. The process of integration was scheduled in two phases: market integration and economic integration. Market integration is designed to achieve the free movement of goods and services, including the coordination of trade, labour and finance. Economic integration involves deeper coordination of the

economies of member states, including monetary coordination, including the introduction of a common currency.

Having gained independence from Britain in the 1960s. 1970s and 1980s, most CARICOM countries are still struggling to be self-sufficient enough to be sovereign states. As the underlying theory for establishing the CSME is to achieve sustainable economic growth and human development, delays in the implementation of the CSME means that people of CARICOM still need to wait to enjoy economic, social, environmental and technological resilience in the region. Issues related to their small economies, a strong attachment to the sense of sovereignty, and the lack of technical capacity as a result of brain-drain, are the main direct causes for the retarded integration movement. Yet, the member states have not coordinated their political will to overcome those issues. Having energy rich countries as neighbours, and other regional integration movements, which are more attractive than the CSME, have threatened to compromise political interests within the CSME.

This study conducted in-depth face-to-face and Skype interviews in the framework of symbolic interactionism from February to July in 2013, from February to April in 2014, and from February to April in 2015. The interview data was transcribed, and then discourse analyses of narratives were carried out. The interviewees were collected by snowball sampling, which depends on the respondents' contacts. Special attention was paid to maintain respondents' anonymity, due to the sensitivity of the interview questions, as most of the respondents occupy high level positions in the governments, international organisations and the private sector.

This study begins with an outline of the history and background of CARICOM's economic integration initiative, the CSME. Section 2 outlines the methodology and methods of the study in the process of research. The following section consists of a literature review of several relevant theories and themes, such as integration, the CSME initiatives, including the Common External Tariff, monetary union, Caribbean Court of Justice, free movement of labour, and production integration and future prospects.

Analyses of the interviews are displayed in the next two chapters, and overall conclusion is given subsequently.

The hope of this study is that any findings will contribute to the scholarship on the CSME, and be of value to academics interested in Caribbean economic and political integration, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), labour migration, and production integration, especially in the context of the Caribbean.

2. History/Background

2.1. The Caribbean

'The Caribbean' generally refers to the region comprising the littoral states of the Caribbean Sea. The Caribbean Basin includes a total of twenty-seven independent states, including single island states, the United States, the Central and South American states, such as Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico, and twelve dependant territories, such as British Virgin Islands and St. Eustatius. As the region had been of colonial interests and subject to economic exploitation by European countries, such as Spain, Britain, France, the Netherlands and others, especially since the 'discovery' of this region by Columbus in the late fifteenth century, the Caribbean Basin is characterised by its diversity in culture, language and ethnicity.

Despite the above, this study refers 'the Caribbean' as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member states and territories, because the study focuses on one of the most important project of CARICOM, the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME). CARICOM comprises of fifteen members, five associate members and seven observers. Those fifteen full members are, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago; the five associate members are Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands; the seven observers are Aruba, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and Netherlands Antilles, such as Curacao and St. Martin. Most of the

full and associate members were formally under British rule, and are now members of the Commonwealth, and observer members are

neighbouring territories who are located in or along the Caribbean Sea.




Figure1-CARICOM location

CARICOM covers a surface area of 459,000 square kilometres, with a total population of 17 million^[1]. The Human Development Index, which ranks the richness of human life, such as life expectancy and literacy, in CARICOM nations, are the highest in the Bahamas (51st) and the lowest in Haiti (168th)^[2] with their per capita GDP ranges from the highest US\$22,245 in the Bahamas and the lowest US\$832.9 in Haiti^[3]. The ethnic composition of the people of the CARICOM reflects its history: the descendants of slaves from Africa, indentured labourers from India, China and South Europe, European colonial planters, and the native Amerindians. Although English is widely spoken in most of the CARICOM member states, French, Spanish and Dutch are also spoken in Haiti, Belize

and Suriname respectively.

2.2. The West Indies Federation

Right before their independence from Britain, the ten small island states and territories of the Commonwealth Caribbean formed the West Indies Federation in 1958. Those island countries were Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, then St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St.Lucia, St.Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago. Belize (then British Honduras), Guyana (then British Guiana) and the British Virgin Island did not join the Federation with a fear that they would be confronted with mass immigration from the less prosperous Caribbean islands^[4]. Devastated by the Second World War, this movement was encouraged by Britain, to

assist the Caribbean colonies in becoming independent, as the Caribbean colonies became a financial burden for Britain^[5]. Britain wished to maintain an efficient administration to sovereign independent nations, simply because the Caribbean colonies no longer provided economic benefit to the British economy^[6].

The West Indies Federation collapsed in 1962 after Jamaica stepped out to start independence negotiations with Britain. The reasons for the failure of the Federation are mostly based on the fact that the expectations and motivation of the participating states were different. The smaller islands were interested only in the freedom of movement to the larger islands with larger economies, such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago^[7]. Trade unionists wished to have a stronger link with the international market^[8]. Members did not agree easily on policies, especially in regard to taxation and central planning, which were imposed by Britain^[9]. Most of territorial governments were not willing to give up power to the Federation^[10]. Based on those reasons for the failure, the integration movement of the Commonwealth Caribbean shifted from coordinating regional politics to achieve political union, to demanding being part of a political union in order to benefit from economic cooperation, in just the same way the European Union achieved integration^[11].

2.3. CARIFTA

On the invitation of Trinidad and Tobago, the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) was founded in 1965 by four Caribbean states: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, and later joined by Dominica, Grenada, St.Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Montserrat, Jamaica and Belize. The main purpose of CARIFTA was to coordinate the economies of the newly independent countries, along with some that were still British territories, to obtain a joint presence in the international market^[12].

Although some academics argue that CARIFTA intended to promote political union as an unspoken agreement^[13], CARIFTA did not achieve political

union in any way. Instead, it focused on the improvement of the economies and living standards of the people in the Common Market. Specifically, it aimed at expanding the regional markets through the removal of trade barriers between members, and by creating a customs union and an economic community for its members^[14].

2.4. The Caribbean Community and Common Market

To establish a common market, the Treaty of Chaguaramas was signed in 1973, to convert CARIFTA to Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM). As of today, CARICOM comprises thirteen Commonwealth Caribbean territories and two non-Commonwealth countries, namely Haiti and Suriname. Under the post-Cold War framework of the world order, the main purpose of CARICOM is to promote the regional human security, which concerns any threats to peaceful human lives, through establishing a common market by introducing Common External Tariff, coordinating foreign policies, and promoting regional cooperation in areas such as health, education, and other areas relating to human and social development.

2.5. CARICOM Single Market and Economy

Four decades passed before the Treaty of Chaguaramas became effective; however, CARICOM had never become an effective and efficient integrated entity. During the forty years, member states have introduced plans for other forms of regional integration besides CARICOM. Most of them which did not materialise, include the Eastern Caribbean Federation, and Trinidad and Tobago and East Caribbean Integration. However, some of them were successfully established, such as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) as a sub-integration body within CARICOM, and Association of Caribbean States (ACS) as a wider Caribbean and Central American integration grouping.

Member states were seeking better integration opportunities to satisfy their objectives of functional economic integration. This was reflected in the Grand Anse Declaration^[15] issued at the 10th

meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of Caribbean Community in 1989, which introduced an integration development strategy. The declaration proposed:

- Deepening economic integration by achieving a common market efficiently and effectively towards a Single Market and Economy;
- Expanding the size of the Caribbean Community through widening the membership to non-Commonwealth Caribbean territories;
- Entering the international trading and economic system, collectively as CARICOM, by strengthening trading links with non-traditional partners.

In 2001, to accelerate the pace of integration, and to include a political element, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaranas^[16], establishing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), was signed by all CARICOM members except for Montserrat, Haiti and the Bahamas. At the time of writing in July 2015, Montserrat and Haiti are currently preparing to join the CSME.

The CSME was scheduled to be implemented in different phases. The CARICOM Single Market was first established in 2006 with twelve CARICOM members. The CARICOM Single Economy, which was initially scheduled to be completed in 2008, has not yet been completed. CARICOM Heads of Government have postponed the implementation of the Single Economy several times, and now it is expected to be completed by the end of 2015.

The Single Economy was to be implemented in two phases, with Phase 1, scheduled to be implemented between 2008 and 2009, and requiring the completion of the following:

- Outline of the Development Vision and set the Regional Development Strategy^[17];
- The expansion of categories of free movement of labour and coordination of social welfare;

- Establishment of Regional Development Fund;
- Establishment of Regional Stock Exchange;
- Implementation of the elements included in the Rose Hall Declaration^[18] on Governance and Mature Regionalism, including:
 - The automatic application of decisions of the Heads of Government meetings at the national level;
 - Implementation of the Common External Tariff;
 - The creation of a CARICOM commission with Executive Authority in the implementation of decisions;
 - The automatic generation of resources to fund regional institutions.
- Further technical work on regional policy frameworks for energy, agriculture, sustainable tourism, transport, new export services and small and medium enterprises;
- Political approval for Enhanced Monetary Cooperation;
- Agreement among Central Banks on common CARICOM currency;
- Technical work on the harmonisation of taxation regimes and related fiscal incentives.

Phase 2 of the Single Economy is scheduled to take place between 2010 and 2015. It is also expected that any decisions taken during Phase 1 would be completed within this period. Phase 2 includes:

- Harmonisation of taxation systems, incentives and the financial environment;
- Implementation of common policies in agriculture, energy-related industries, transport, small and medium enterprises, and sustainable tourism;
- Implementation of the Regional Competition Policy and Regional Intellectual Property Regime;

- Harmonisation of fiscal and monetary policies;
- Implementation of a CARICOM Monetary Union, including introduction of common currency.

As of July 2015, few of these aforementioned elements have been fully implemented. Having been delayed years, many academics, economists, politicians, businesspersons, and many others are not optimistic about the scheduled plan that the CSME is to be fully functional by the end of 2015. In May 2014, with the funding from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, CARICOM issued a Strategic Plan for the Caribbean Community 2015-2019: Repositioning

CARICOM^[19] to reform CARICOM in order to accelerate coordination of member states to fully implement the CSME. The plan identifies the CSME as one of the most important priorities of CARICOM to achieve sustained economic development based on international competitiveness and coordinated economic policies and enhanced trade and economic relations with other countries. This means that CARICOM has acknowledged the achievement of the CSME as the only way forward for socioeconomic growth and human development in the region. The next section examines the research methodology employed in this study to explore the obstacles and perspectives of the achievement of the CSME.

CARICOM



Figure2: CARICOM members, associate members, observers, CSME members

3. Methods/Methodology

3.1. Methodology

This section discusses the research methodology employed in this study to explore the obstacles to, and perspectives of the completion of the

establishment of the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME). The epistemological position taken for this research is constructionism, which “assumes that people create and maintain meaningful words through dialectical processes of

conferring meaning on their realities and acting within them...”^[20]. This approach acknowledges that “the categories, concepts, and theoretical level of an analysis emerge from the researcher’s interaction within the field and qualities about the data”^[21]. This research is methodologically situated within the framework of symbolic interactionism, which is based on an idea that individuals exchange symbols with each other to make sense of the social realities, which have been weaved into their experiences^[22]. Being one of the typical symbols, language allows researchers to examine how individuals communicate with each other in words; generally speaking, therefore, symbolic interactionism implies interviews, which involves face-to-face interaction of between the researcher and the subject^[23].

3.2. Methods

Few studies on rationales for obstacles and perspectives of the CSME exist; therefore, literature on the CSME and its in-depth analyses are insufficient. This study seeks to produce unpublished knowledge of the actual deficiencies and future perspectives of the realisation of Caribbean regional economic integration as the CSME, through in-depth interviews, both in person and via Skype video calls. Collected data was later transcribed and then analysed.

In order to shed light on opinions and experiences which have been misrepresented or ignored, qualitative methods are ideal^[24], because these methods, of which interviews are common, allow the researcher to collect “realities” from seldom heard interviewees^[25]. Given the fact that those “realities” are the product of interviewees’ very subjective standpoint, it is difficult to generalise and produce scientific statistical data from those “realities”. Nevertheless, those “realities” can provide insights, explanations and space for interpretation, especially because few in-depth analyses of the CSME exist. In particular, interviews depend on interviewees’ experiences and memories, and all the data gathered through interviews need to be verified, analysed and placed in an accurate political context. This is how critical interpretation of the data will yield rich

information, including complex political elements.

3.3. Access

At the time, this study chose interviews as a means of collecting primary data, and there were five persons to be the gatekeepers to introduce prospective interviewees. The five are: a senior project officer at CARICOM secretariat (Trinidadian); a regional investment banker at a private bank (Trinidadian); an economist at a regional central bank (Dominican); two businesspersons (Guyanese and Jamaican, respectively). In the past thirteen years, while the researcher worked and resided in the region, a close professional relationship was established with each of the gatekeepers. Since this research needed to maintain stable access to suitable interviewees, a snowball sampling approach was used to obtain a non-random sample of CARICOM related informants. This approach provided easier access to individuals who were willing to be interviewed and who would thus supply further potential contacts. Given the politically sensitive nature of the research topic, only forty-six people agreed to be interviewed. Those are twenty-five males and twenty-one females, varying from businesspersons to senior government officials at the ministerial level, aged from twenty-five to seventy-two. This is not a representative number to generalise the data derived from the interviews; however, this research takes a position that those thirty-eight interviewees provided opportunities to obtain rich, in-depth, unique and valuable data which cannot be found anywhere in published works.

3.4. Interviews

Out of agreed forty-six interview targets, forty-four respondents were called upon for interviews. Two of those agreed targets lost contact on the scheduled interview dates. In this research, the data from forty-one respondents were analysed, since only those interviews were recorded completely without distractions. All of the interviewees were of CARICOM member states origin, have been working in the private sector, the governments or the government entities in CARICOM states, or have

been working for CARICOM in any fields. Due to the politically sensitive nature of the interview questions, the researcher attempted to assure the anonymity of the interviewees. However, the small size and closeness of the people of this region, which was appreciated at the sampling stage, did not allow complete anonymity. Without the researcher's disclosure, some respondents easily guessed what kind of answers specific respondents provided. This evidence shows that the nature of this topic easily allowed others to guess the identity of the other informants. Nevertheless, in the analysis chapters, names of the informants are all anonymous.

Face-to-face interviews, either in person or video Skype, were conducted with respondents, who were living in nineteen different countries, because the researcher believed that face-to-face interviews with successful icebreaking talks would open up the respondents. Although the researcher travelled to some island countries to conduct the interviews, travelling to all the CARICOM nations, the US, Canada, and the UK was not possible due to the researcher's limited research schedule and budget. Under these circumstances, video Skype interviews were conducted. Due to slow internet in Guyana where the researcher was based, video Skype interviews sometimes were interrupted with noise and unexpected disconnection. It is doubtful that those interviews would provide high quality data, because concentration and attention of the respondents were interrupted.

After the respondents consented to being recorded, interviews started in a comfortable space with icebreaking questions. In doing so, rapport between the researcher and the interview respondents was encouraged. Interviews were designed to be completed in thirty to forty-five minutes. However, because the researcher allowed the respondents to talk freely with some directions, most of the interviews took more than ninety minutes, and the longest on took four hours. All the recorded interviews were transcribed for analyses.

3.5. Ethics

Research for this study, especially interviews,

was ethically conducted to avoid the following: any harm to participants, a lack of informed consent, and an invasion of privacy. Although the issue of confidentiality is argued to raise particular difficulties for many forms of qualitative research^{[26][27]}, in this research, respondents provided unpublished, very politically sensitive information and opinions that might be harmful to their images in political and social domains. Therefore, anonymity in their names, designation, background information, interview records and transcripts were well-kept. Also, this research attempts to minimise potential risk to the image of any organisations and countries.

Many studies argue that gaining access to participants becomes political as it entails negotiation^{[28][29]}, yet, the researcher did not experience political negotiation, because most of the gatekeepers occupy high or senior positions at their respective organisations. Therefore, it may be possible that their authority forced reluctant prospective respondents to agree to participate in the research. However, those whom the gatekeepers introduced talked freely without hesitation, and provided valuable information. Hence, the researcher did not experience any attempt at manipulation by the gatekeepers, the participants or organisations.

3.6. Analysis

The research employed discourse analyses to paraphrase, categorise and contextualise statements in the transcribed interview data. This method of analysis concerns how aspects of the mind, such as identity and memory, emerge in relation to the language use in a discursive context^[30], and how the language use is influenced by political concerns to reveal reality^[31]. In interviews, for instance, different terms were used to describe people of Caribbean origin by people of Caribbean origin, depending on the contexts of discourse, such as 'we', 'they', 'those people' and 'the Caribbean people'. In this way, discourse analysis allows to see how individuals build narrative discourse about the social world around them^[32].

Although discourse analysis provides opportunities to obtain valuable data, its research

findings are not generalizable to other findings by other researchers to claim external validity. The nature of discourse analysis, which deals with a relatively small amount of data collected from specific settings, such as interviews, does not make it possible to provide representative findings; therefore, generalised data from discourse analysis is considered difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, reflexive researchers, which are critical and open to data, research process and findings, are able to provide representative and generalised findings^[33]. As such, the validity of analysis depends on the quality of the researcher. Consequently, solid arguments will produce dependable data. Hence, discourse analysis can be effective, since insight and knowledge will emerge from strong grounded arguments.

3.7. Difficulties

The concern before conducting interviews was the researcher's ethnicity, because Caribbean people are known to be shy and closed to non-Caribbean people^[34]. Unless they share their information with the entire context, the researcher would have failed to have a grasp of information as data. Failure to interpret the contexts can lead to misrepresenting collected data and its reliability. However, as far as the interviews were concerned, no difficulties were experienced in building a rapport with the interviewees. This might be because all of the respondents were comfortable enough with the researcher to open up, thanking to the researcher's deep knowledge and experience of the Caribbean accented English, which is even adjustable to distinctive accent of each Caribbean island, to show how much the researcher shares the same background with the respondents.

Additionally, the researcher's gender as a female, sometimes played as "resource"^[35]. As Adams (1999) reports female field worker's experiences, the researcher was treated as "a mascot"^[36], rather than a researcher. Particularly, some younger male respondents seemed to enjoy chatting with the researcher at relaxed interview settings, rather than being interviewed. Moreover, some older

respondents as senior political figures treated the researcher as a 'good girl'.

One of the most difficult issues experienced in this research was an access to interview venues. As the research respondents were scattered everywhere in the Caribbean, and a few in North America, the UK and Japan, special efforts were made to set up face-to-face interviews where the researcher and the respondents agreed to meet. Fortunately, many respondents frequently travelled regionally on business or privately, especially to Guyana, where CARICOM secretariat is located and where the researcher resided until July 2013. Despite this strategic location, the researcher had to travel to some Caribbean islands to conduct interviews. This geographical scattering of the respondents was the main difficulty the research experienced. Indeed, the scattering of the Caribbean islands has also been a stumbling block to Caribbean integration.

Many pieces of methodological literature discusses racial and/or ethnic matching and its effects regarding interracial interviews^[37], which the researcher conducted. This literature centres on the relationship between white researchers and the minority as presumed powerless non-white subject, which is not a case of this research. Additionally, this research finds validity, to some degree, in the argument by Axline (1979) that "no non-Caribbean academic can write about Caribbean politics and culture with the depth of understanding and feeling of West Indian"^[38]. Further, even though Papadopoulos and Lees (2002) advocate ethnic matching strategy as an example of ethnic sensitivity in research^[39], which should be practiced whenever possible, it was impossible to achieve this in this research, because the researcher, as a non-African, non-Indian, non-Chinese, non-white, non-mixed, Japanese female, researching the majority of ethnically diverse Caribbean people with African, Indian, Chinese, White, and mixed background. This research setting made the researcher feel vulnerable. From this experience, it can be said that race/ethnic matching strategies are exploited to build rapport and cooperation, and to gain access to the authentic views and experiences of the research target group.

Furthermore, if the research had not been conducted by a Japanese or an outsider, and if the researcher had been of the Caribbean, different data, specifically more detailed data, might have been collected. Nevertheless, it also can be said, as Kondo (2001) shared her experience, being of the same race, ethnicity or gender does not guarantee difficult-free research^[40].

Thus, the non-Caribbean female researcher for a study on the CSME might not have been the best candidate to collect un-manipulated and in-depth data from the Caribbean respondents. However, it is evident that the researcher's knowledge and enthusiasm for this topic guided her to conduct research objectively without any biases.

4. Literature Review

4.1. Introduction

The aim of this study is to determine what has caused the integration initiative of the Commonwealth Caribbean, the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME), to falter; and how it should proceed in order to achieve its purpose of the integration and socioeconomic development of the region. As many academics argue, since the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas establishing the CSME was signed by CSME participating CARICOM countries in 2001, the slow progress of the initiative has not only caused longstanding frustration, but has also contributed to the weakening of the structure and operations of CARICOM^{[41][42]}. These studies discuss the status, and offer recommendations on what needs to be done to achieve the objectives; however, as the CSME specialist Dr. Norman Girvan indicates, there is a paucity of integration research that debates more about real issues behind the delayed implementation of the functioning CSME, rather than the restrictions which confine its implementation and operations^[43].

This section attempts to explore the theories behind the obstacles of, and prospects for the full implementation of the CSME. As of July 2015, twelve out of fifteen CARICOM members will try to achieve the full implementation of the CSME. The CSME consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados,

Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St.Kitts and Nevis, St.Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. In addition, Montserrat, a CARICOM member as British Overseas Territory has been in a process of obtaining the necessary instrument of entrustment for the UK for its full participation in the CSME.

4.2. Integration

Integration is a process which allows separate entities to construct a common framework which enables the collective pursuit of objectives and unified implementation of policies^[44]. These objectives are set to promote the development of a stronger economy, to improve the living conditions and security, and to share the common priorities for external relations to represent members, especially in a diplomatic setting. A well-functioning integration entity can act internationally, and form social integration politically, because mutual dependence increases and demands a framework for political order^[45].

4.3. CARICOM Integration as the CSME

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) as well as its economic integration initiative, the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME), is regarded as a weak, inefficient and ineffective institution^[46]. Yet, participating member states have been unable or unwilling to tackle the real shortfall in the institution as a regional government entity, and overcome the deficiencies, in order to achieve this goal of integration. Some of these deficiencies include original mandates set for CARICOM and the CSME, a lack of natural, political and financial resources, and a lack of human and technical capital due to brain-drain^[47]. These resource problems definitely discourage the implementation of regional level agreements. Being funded by the UK, CARICOM has issued a strategic plan to reform CARICOM to enhance its economic, social, environmental and technological resilience in order to achieve economic stability and growth, a better quality of life through sustainable development. Nevertheless, it is evident that national and regional politics is the one which

fundamentally retards the integration process, since regional level efforts would be able to conquer those deficiencies, if there were a strong political will.

Other obstacles, which have caused delays in the implementation of the CSME, are a Caribbean perception of sovereignty to which a “high premium” is attached^[48], and intergovernmental power relations. Indeed, distinctive Caribbean perceptions of sovereignty, which have been cultivated with the cultural politics of resistance, since independence from Britain, is very strong. When it is accelerated by power relations between member states, which are mostly based on economic size, especially within the Caribbean Basin and Latin America in the post-Cold War world order, it contributes to a disorganised CARICOM and the CSME.

This study stands on a position that as far as the objectives of integration are clear and reasonable, integration amongst economically diverse states is possible, although it is challenging. To balance the gap, larger states, as leading members of the integration movement, tend to provide smaller states with military, economic and other resources for security. Integration with much smaller states then becomes a burden for larger states. For example, in 2012, Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar warned the regional small partners not to expect Trinidad and Tobago to play a role of “ATM card”^[49]. On the contrary, smaller states tend to be sensitive to being exploited by larger states in exchange for their sovereignty^[50]. Indeed, the history

of integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean has shown that smaller states sometimes became suspicious about a leading larger state, as seen in many regional integration initiatives proposed by Trinidad and Tobago which ended up in failure, such as a proposed integration initiative with the smaller East Caribbean countries^[51]. Smaller states therefore, do not wish to have one leading larger state spearhead the integration process, due to a fear that their sovereignty may be manipulated by this larger state^[52]. In reality, less advanced smaller islands have done well without the intervention of bigger CARICOM sister islands. In particular, the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), a sub-regional integration entity within CARICOM, has achieved economic integration even to the point of a shared common currency. As such, it is challenging for independent member states to transfer their sovereignty to a common integrated entity.

Even Dr. Norman Girvan, an economist, who had been an advocate of the CSME for decades, started questioning the purpose, role and relevance of CARICOM and the CSME, because of “the slowness and ineffectiveness of the Community’s response” to respond to, for example, an international economic crisis in 2008, as if they had no interests^[53]. It is evident that a lack of interest of member states to represent themselves in an integration entity retards the process of integration.



Image1- CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana.

4.4. Expansion of Trade

The expectation that export will increase extra-regional trade has been used to justify the establishment of the CSME^[54], because it is considered to be a necessary response to globalisation. This study argues that although it is important to develop soft infrastructure in an attempt to increase not only exports, but also develop the regional economy, CSME countries need to achieve more fundamental issues in order for their production to increase. Aiming to strengthen their international competitiveness, implementation of a Common External Tariff is considered^[55], however, although an increase in export and growth are strongly related, the relationship between the effects of globalisation and under-development is still a controversial discussion^{[56][57]}.

Moreover, as many academics noted, the setting of the expansion of trade as a goal, as a means of promoting development, is not the proper way to achieve it^[58]. Further, although establishing a framework for trade is effective in combating the negative impact of globalisation, it is not sufficient to achieve sustainable development. Most of all, the situation in the Caribbean is more complicated. What the Caribbean especially needs instead, is to pursue technological improvement and labour productivity in agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. It is evident in a case of Trinidad and Tobago that the country has achieved success in product diversification, productivity improvements, technological gains and growth, as well as an expansion in intra and extra-regional trade. Of course Trinidad and Tobago's success is directly tied to its abundant natural resources; however, the country's strategies to diversify its energy industry should not be neglected. As such, this empirical example implies that the CSME needs to work with member states' national development strategies in order to achieve national economic success, because a stronger economy is more likely to contribute to the achievement of integration and exploit positive gains from globalisation, than just setting up a framework to expand trade.

4.5. The Monetary Union

The theoretical background behind the establishment of a monetary union and common currency is that they would enhance economic integration within the region. In other words, by having a single currency, intra-regional trade would be stimulated, and economic activities would be promoted. However, this theory, which is applicable to the case of the EU, has been questioned in relation to its applicability to the CSME^{[59][60]}. The study by Anthony and Hallett (2000) indicates that having a regional common currency would not provide any benefits to the CSME, such as the elimination of the transaction costs, due to the small amount of intra-regional trade, and even recommends the use of US dollar in the CSME, instead of establishing a new common currency, because the US dollar represents a superior currency union than a new currency, which has no credibility^[61]. Moreover, some of the member countries have high levels of fiscal deficits and debts, which could jeopardise the credibility and the sustainability of the currency union. Further, the nature of the CSME trade, and huge gaps in many aspects of the economies of member states, would not allow deepening in the single market.

Although CARICOM's sub-regional integration organisation, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is enjoying the benefits of a monetary union, including common currency and fiscal conditions, it is not certain how many of the CSME member states are truly interested in participating in the proposed monetary union, or how many of them have actually started consulting with their citizens on this issue. This study questions whether the CSME monetary union brings any benefits to member states, or if it is even feasible. Some studies concluded that the CSME monetary union initiative will prove unsuccessful^[62]; however, the CSME member states may wish to pursue political interests, such as the provision of social infrastructure improved governance, a stronger CSME voice on international issues through improved foreign policy coordination, by establishing monetary union.

4.6. The Caribbean Court of Justice

In 2001, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was established to act as institutional centrepiece court to support the rules of the CSME. The CCJ functions as a mechanism to assure economic freedom and flexibility in accordance with CSME rules, and to provide coercive measures for those member states that violate these rules. What is unique about the CCJ is that it has both appellate and original jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction deals with civil, criminal and constitutional matters, where it serves as the final court of appeal of member states. On the other hand, in its compulsory and exclusive original jurisdiction, it hears disputes between member states and the CSME, referrals from domestic courts, and applications by CSME nationals with special leave of the court. To this date, only Belize, Barbados, Guyana and Dominica have fully ratified. One of the reasons for member states' reluctance is, again, the CCJ is regarded as weakening the sovereignty of member states, since the CCJ will become the final court of appeal, replacing the Privy Council of England^[63]. Moreover, there exist few qualified, skilled personnel, in their respective states, to persuade the government and nationals to move forward to ratify the CCJ. Additionally, the current institutional setting, which lacks the body to protect and promote the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, does not allow individuals to be willing and capable of bringing proceedings against member states.

4.7. Free Movement of Labour

The free movement of labour, an initiative of the CSME which allows skilled CSME nationals to freely travel and seek work within the CSME, has made relatively significant progress. Administration arrangements for issuing Caribbean Vocational Qualification (CVQ) to prove a person is skilled and qualified for free movement have not been completed by all the member states. On the other hand, a common passport, CARIPASS, is a good development, which enables CSME nationals to travel the region freely and stay in one country for up to six months. However, fear, rooted in nationalism, has become an obstacle for the smooth movement of skilled personnel. Specifically, more prosperous countries, in particular Trinidad and

Tobago, and Barbados, are concerned that the free movement of labour will swamp their market with immigrants and therefore intensify competition for jobs, which may lead to increased unemployment in their countries. Reports are frequently heard that certain nationals of the CSME member states have been treated in a discriminatory way by immigration officials of certain other countries^[64]. Although the popular immigration destinations for CSME labour is not within the CSME, but North America and Europe^[65], the competitive nationalism amongst member states detracts from one of the most important initiatives of the CSME, to promote the socioeconomic development of the region.



Image 2: Trinidad's Energy Industry.

4.8. Production Integration

In order to expand the size of the market, the private sector in the region needs to improve their production and to expand trade to external states. As a main objective of the CSME is to promote and accelerate development through mobilising the resources and capacities of the region, within an integration framework, it requires pursuing further integration in production, specifically the organisation and coordination of integrated regional industrial complexes, from raw materials to finished products. There are a number of projects inspired by the Governments, including upgrading of regional airlines^[66], a natural gas pipeline from Trinidad and Tobago to the Eastern Caribbean states^[67], Barbadian capital to invest in sea island cotton in Guyana^[68], Guyana sugar to be refined in Trinidad using Trinidad's manufacturing skills and cheaper energy^[69], Guyana-Suriname petroleum exploration^[70], and bauxite and alumina from Guyana and Jamaica to be smelted in Trinidad using its cheaper energy^{[71][72]}.



Image 3: Sugarcane fields in Guyana.

Despite those proposals, the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (2006) discusses what is more important is to educate the business community more about the CSME to promote further production integration. Also, relating to the free movement of labour initiative, the best qualified and skilled candidates should occupy prominent positions in the projects regardless of their nationality. In many cases, the investment recipient governments prefer to see their nationals occupying important positions in the projects^[73]. Most of all, more fundamental issues, such as the existence of separate currencies, differences in labour costs as well as cost of living within the region, make production integration much more complex. From a political point of view, business decisions are often different and opposite from political considerations. Therefore, government intervention in the production sector should be limited. Furthermore, a more effective maritime and air transport system is needed in order to ensure an optimum level of production integration.

Moreover, the sale of products from CARICOM must be promoted within the region and especially outside the region. Although most of the products in the region are very small, there are a few large multinational corporations such as Grace Kennedy, headquartered in Jamaica and Ansa McAl, headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago. The Community's large corporations are not as large as international players; however, even small firms could participate in extra-regional export if they target niche

markets for Caribbean products.

4.9. Macroeconomic Governance

Despite the retarded integration process, the importance of the CSME is valid. Yet, in order to complete the process of integration into a functioning economic union, this study argues the CSME member states need to conduct fundamental economic restructuring, and to improve their macroeconomic governance. Official development assistance from traditional developing partners, such as the UK and the US, has decreased drastically in this decade^[74]. Socioeconomic development levels of CSME member states are still varied, and smaller states definitely still need assistance.



Image 4: Volcanic disaster in Montserrat.

Most of the member states' external public debts have increased significantly during the last decades^[75]. Contributing factors to increasing debts are, small economies and huge expenditures on hard infrastructure project such as rehabilitation from the damages caused by hurricanes and floods, and airport expansion. This unusual level of expenditure is documented by international organisations. According to United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the economic cost of natural disaster in the Caribbean between 2000 and 2014 is estimated at US\$30 billion^[76]. The World Bank estimates that average annual natural disaster losses in the Caribbean is US\$850 million, which in the Pacific, the average is US\$200 million annually^[77].



Image 4: Frequent floods in Guyana.

In 2015, five out of the CARICOM member states are among the most highly indebted countries in the world, while ten are considered as having unsustainable levels of indebtedness, with debt to GDP ratios ranging from 65 to 140 %^[78]. With debts of this size, limited resources would be spent on development, in order to meet these debt obligations. In response, more prosperous member countries, such as Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados, offer assistance to disadvantaged member states, such as Guyana and Grenada as South-South cooperation. This self-sufficient movement is welcomed, as it promotes the sense of ‘oneness’ for member states. In order to reduce this level of debt, the performance of the production sector needs to be improved to increase exports. In addition, although development is important, spending for the purpose of infrastructure development should decrease. Further, the efficiency of tax collection and allocation of government resources also need to be improved.

4.10. CARICOM Governance

The CSME implementing body, the CARICOM Secretariat needs to improve its governance in order to function better. Mullerleile (2003) argues that its inefficiency is based on its location in the weakest “non-developing country”, Guyana, under-developed infrastructure, short supply of qualified and trained employees, and bad transportation connections that has resulted in a tiresome itinerary for visitors^[79]. These claims are partially valid; however, this study does not necessarily support these points. Firstly, there is an

increasing number of claims by donors, such as the UN and bilateral partners including the EU and Japan, that CARICOM staff members, especially technical experts travel too often, and the donors assert that the financial assistance allocated to projects is spent on travel to discuss these projects, which do not necessarily bear any fruits^[80].

Secondly, with the advancement of communication technology, tele-conference is possible even in Guyana, which also reduces the amount of travel for meetings. Concerning infrastructure in Guyana, as of 2015, the CARICOM Secretariat building, is not necessarily weaker or less developed than government buildings in other member states. Thirdly, in regard to unavailability of qualified and skilled personnel in Guyana, experts, project staff and consultants working under CARICOM are from member states, and as far as they retain their citizenship, some Caribbean Diasporas in North America and Europe have returned to work for CARICOM. Thus, the CSME has not experienced a shortage of skilled and qualified staff members at the CARICOM Secretariat based in Guyana.

One of the biggest problems that CARICOM continues to tackle, and which is preventing the full implementation of the CSME, is that the decisions made at the heads of government conference are left untouched, or if implemented, done so very slowly, due to the political corruption and the lack of technical experts in each member state^[81]. Indeed, the political corruption of CARICOM decreases its credibility in policymaking, resulting in a loss of public trust. The coordination of the pace of the implementation of decisions therefore requires a transparent executive commission which oversees and enforces the implementation of decisions in each member states. Enforcing institutions make sure that a higher priority is given to the CSME, rather than the national interests of each member state. Further, agreements taken at the Heads of Government meetings must be binding and lasting. In particular, decision-making in CARICOM is done by unanimous voting, and politicians and officials, oftentimes know each other, and sometimes friends and families, do not want to appear to be opposed to the initiatives proposed by their friends and families,

thereby affecting the decision-making process. Further, it leads those taking the decisions, to regard the agreement as non-binding and renegotiable. When this concept of lose agreement is added to the insufficient administrative capacity to implement at the national level, it results in the abandoning of the agreement, even after being paid lip service. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that important agreements in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas to establish the CSME have not been worked on.

In the wake of CARICOM, political union was considered to be easily achievable through closer economic integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean^[82]. Yet, four decades later, many studies indicate that CARICOM cannot do more than the coordination of regional government policies^[83]. Though delayed for years, the initiative of regional integration is still valid, and establishing the union is possible, if regional concerns are given priority over national interests. The Caribbean member states should compromise at least some degree of their sovereignty and national interests. Nonetheless, some academics argue that it may be difficult for these Caribbean countries, which became independent a few decades ago to give up anything that represents political independence, even if it will result in an improved standard of living^[84]. Additionally, politicians and bureaucrats in each member state should give up their power, but they do not wish to, because, according to Rainford (1986), “the Caribbean leader wanted to remain big fish in a small pond”^[85]. Also, the bureaucracy in CARICOM’s increasing environment of committees and special institutions slows down the integration progress, as the coordination of these entities is challenging. Hence, instead of establishing more sub-bodies, what the CSME needs is the establishment of one authority which provides technical direction and coordinates the pace of implementation among member states. In addition, it also needs strong political will to pursue the remodelling of its economy to be more competitive. Further, the governments of each member state need to educate their citizens about the CSME, especially its merits and on the integration process itself. The people of the CARICOM need to be aware that socioeconomic

development will be brought about by economic integration which neighbouring Caribbean countries, and that their country by itself, does not provide a sufficient size of economy to live with other countries in the international market.

The external environment around the CSME has been changing drastically. Many other regional integration initiatives have emerged in the Caribbean and Central and South America, such as the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), and the Union of South American States (UNASUR). Most of those initiatives already include some of the CSME member states, and there have already been concerns that those organisations would create divisions amongst CARICOM member states^[86], which undoubtedly will affect the implementation of the CSME. Thus, the CSME now stands in a position to review its purpose and role as the Caribbean economic integration movement.



Image 5: Hurricane damage in Dominica.

4.11. Conclusion

The delay of the full implementation of the CSME is a result of combination of many factors. Most of them have originated from the nature of the majority of its member states. In particular, as most of the CSME member states are relatively newly independent states, they are still struggling to be self-sufficient as independent sovereign states, with a series of issues, such as limited economic activities in small market,

brain-drain, stubborn attachment to national sovereignty, unavailability of capacity to offer institutional and technical support for the implementation of decisions, and not-so active intra-regional trade, to name a few.

To break in the deadlock of retarded progress of integration process for the CSME, governance of CARICOM and the member states need to be improved to be more efficient and effective. In order to achieve this, each member state should turn in its sovereignty over to the CARICOM, and politicians in each member state should give up their power to coordinate their national interests to feed into the regional interests, which is to establish the CSME. Consequently, a more organised and disciplined CARICOM will be empowered enough to provide technical directions and oversee the pace of implementation among the member states. Moreover, in order for the CSME to be supported by the citizens of its member states, strategic public awareness projects should be arranged. Furthermore, the CSME should provide a framework to remodel the economy of the member states to be more competitive enough to increase the external exports by promoting production integration, which will be beneficial to the socioeconomic development of the CSME member states.

5. Analysis: Obstacles for the CSME

5.1. Introduction

As seen in the previous chapter, the reasons for the slow progress of the Caribbean Community Single Market and Economy (CSME) are many. Yet, the rationales behind the reasons for delay are still unclear. This section and the next will examine exactly what has delayed the CSME, and what needs to be done to promote it.

In this section, the background of the delay, combined with sensitive issues, such as nationalism and the Caribbean's distinctive sense of sovereignty, and political power relations amongst CSME member states, are explored.

5.2. Political Will

CARICOM's attempt to achieve integration in the

form of the CSME has been longstanding. Implementing the CSME is a priority, and no longer an option, just like the Caribbean states experienced in previous integration initiatives, such as the West Indies Federation and CARIFTA. This is especially the case, because globalisation has advanced since those integration initiatives were introduced.

This slow progress gives the impression that the CSME member states are no longer interested in achieving integration. Nonetheless, press releases issued right after the annual Head of the Government of the CARICOM meetings show their strong will, as the premiers of the Caribbean states at least understand and agree on the importance of the CSME, in unifying the region's economy and coordinating regional voices into one, to present to the international arena.

From the standpoint of policymaker, a minister, whose designation is economy and economic cooperation, stated:

We understand... wait, let me say... I understand the importance of the CSME, of course. As a citizen of this country, and as minister... I understand the CSME is important. I am an economist, you know... I have to know, I should know, and I should be responsible for moving this country to be integrated in the CSME, I know that ...^[87]

It is notable that this respondent used 'we' to represent his country's stance towards the CSME, but soon realised there was a segment of the society that does not agree on the importance of the CSME. At the time of interview, he showed some frustration when he talked about the problems and issues he saw as economist, and the reality that he, as minister, cannot move his country forward to achieve integration, which he believes to be important. The real problem is, according to the respondent, that politics in his country affects the decision-making process, and in this regard, there is no difference amongst each member state.

...our politics back home, politics in each state are no difference... There are powerful "big boys" who sitting at the club in _____ [name

of the capital of his country], or any cities in the Caribbean... they talk about politics and economy over a glass of rum, good best rum... Those “big boys” are the real players of the country...^[88].

According to him, “the real players” of the politics in his country are not the ministers, economists or university lecturers whose faces you see on newspapers, but “the big boys”, who have retired from the political scene and acted as unofficial advisors to control the politics of the country. Those politically powerful men tend to be economically influential as well, and he said “to keep the government, and if you want to remain a politician”, their opinion has to be valued.

This respondent’s background as economist plays an interesting role. The morals required as an economist and minister to pursue integration, and the political sensitivity to be respected in order to remain as politician, are conflicting. Unfortunately, both do not seem to coexist. This conflict is the cause of frustration he showed, and this conflict is similar to what the CSME is experiencing. Namely, the heads of the states agree and understand the importance of the integration; nevertheless, those decisions made by the heads would not materialise, once taken to each state. In short, there is a strong political will amongst member states to achieve full implementation of the CSME, yet internal politics in each member state prevents this from materialising.

On contrary, there is another respondent, who works for CARICOM, questions “the quality” of ministers, and argues not all the ministers that sit at the Heads of the Government of CARICOM meetings are aware of the importance of the CSME or the needs of the member states; therefore, for some states, there is no such thing as political will to complete the integration. She continues that those ministers are not serious about the CSME or even CARICOM. They treat CARICOM as an “Ole Boys Club”, where “they gather, enjoy light talk, and pose in front of the cameras with smiles, as if they were at a school reunion”^[89].

It is evident that there is a minister, like the

respondent, who has a background as economist, and understands what is important for the Caribbean. At the same time, as both of the respondents claim, national politics deteriorate the national political will to implement the CSME. As discussed in a previous section, national interests with respect to “the real players” are prioritised over the regional interest, which is the establishment of the CSME. Further, because the political will is less likely to materialise because of the politically strong “real players”, the heads of state have given up on working on the decisions, or they have never oriented themselves seriously with those decisions. Regardless of why the decisions are not taken seriously, what is even worse, is that high level government officials come together for the cameras, and then walk away from those meetings without the slightest intension of implementing the decisions which they said they would.

5.3. Sovereignty

While the classical concept of sovereignty, which envisions the state with absolute unfettered rights by laws, has been questioned on its legitimacy^[90], sovereignty is an independent authority over a geographical area, such as a state. As the previous section discusses the “high premium” attached to sovereignty^[91], this study argues that undoubtedly, sovereignty in the Caribbean plays both positive and negative roles in the CSME. The positive side of the Caribbean sovereignty relates to regionalism, which puts more importance on regional identity than national identity, and it promotes Caribbean integration to protect and expand the Caribbean market, and coordinate policies to present a collective position in the international arena. In other words, when Caribbean sovereignty functions positively, it attempts to protect and support Caribbean sovereignty from external powers. Indeed, Lewis (2004) supports this argument by describing that the Caribbean countries seek an identity as “positive philosophy to replace the habits of colonial dependency”^[92]. In short, if this collective identity carried more weight regionally, rather than the single identity of each independent state, this collective identity could certainly accelerate the

implementation of the CSME.

On the other hand, when sovereignty functions negatively, national identity limits member states' interest as a member of the CSME, and national interest is given a higher priority than the regional interest. In particular, national sovereignty functions as hindrance to the integration process, as it places more value on the interest of a sovereign state to pursue its own agenda, which may be in conflict with regional interests.

This argument is supported by a respondent who works for a regional development bank. Judging from her experience in examining proposals submitted by the governments of the member states for project funding, she insists that the region needs to further enhance its identity as an integrated Caribbean^[93]. This was especially the case when foreign assistance to the bank decreased in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, and the region's socioeconomic development, as reflected in economic indicators, did not necessarily reflect the quality of people's lives; therefore, the region needs to focus on regional projects, rather than single state projects, in order to pool the limited resources to benefit as many states as possible. For example, a project, such as agro-product marketing to increase exports to the EU market, is a more logical and strategic idea that would benefit the CSME member states as a whole, which would then have a positive impact on the CSME's agro-sector coordination and diversification.

The respondent shared an experience with a government official from Dominica who submitted a proposal, regarding agro-product marketing to the EU market, which only focused on a small island state, Dominica.

...I asked him if he really thinks if Dominica alone can walk into the EU market and strive with other banana producing countries from all over the world... He said, he does not want to share his proposal with a St.Lucian... Yes, I am from St. Lucia, but I am more a West Indian... especially when I am at work... they don't know how small *WE* are as the Caribbean market...^[94]

Dominica and St. Lucia are both banana exporting countries, and there may be a conflict of interests regarding access to the EU banana market. However, it is notable to see a government official from Dominica display such strong nationalism or national interests, in pursuit of the socioeconomic development of his country. It is understandable to see some gaps in the degree of understanding of the CSME among ordinary people of the Caribbean; however, the Dominican government official's level of understanding of the CSME is concerning, as it misleads the member state. This also affects the consistency and implementation of decisions, and the coordination of implementation levels amongst member states, to complete the establishment of the CSME.

With regard to the claim that Caribbean leaders are unwilling to give up powers to CARICOM to promote integration, a senior government official shared his view.

...everybody knows the CSME is important. We know we have nowhere to go without it. I don't think nobody is unwilling to assign CARICOM to take over the leading part... it is just that we don't want to be the only one who surrender our power... when our colleagues remain enjoying their sovereign entitlements. It is timing... coordination of timing... what you have to do is bothersome, and you know good things don't come right away, and there's no discipline measures...who wants to do that?... you know, we are politicians. We are good at playing with words... don't forget that we have to worry about people's judgement and politics back home...^[95]

In this discourse, the sovereignty dilemma exists in the contradiction between national sovereignty and achievement of the CSME. The respondent also added national interests and politics as reasons for a slow progress. The senior official clearly states that he understands the importance of the CSME, yet because there is no enforcing facility to coordinate the implementation of decisions, and because the implementation is "bothersome", he considers that it is

acceptable not to proceed with implementation. Moreover, the respondent forces responsibility of slow implementation onto CARICOM for not providing enforcement measures. Although this sounds demanding and harsh, it can be interpreted that if CARICOM is assigned more legislative authority, all the countries would follow. It follows therefore, that if an external authority is established at CARICOM to oversee member states' implementation, and to issue penalties for those who do not follow the authority's instructions, the issue of sovereignty will not be direct reason for any delays.

Caribbean sovereignty is therefore not straightforward. National sovereignty, which places priority on a sovereign state's national interests, is troublesome in the context of coordinating the CSME member states to pursue regional economic integration. Regional sovereignty, which is tied to the concept of the West Indies, should be enhanced, as it feeds to support the implementation of CSME.

5.4. Nationalism and Xenophobia

While individual Caribbean countries boast about their own national identity, if it becomes excessive, it will produce exclusive nationalism and xenophobia, which assumes an offensive attitude for 'us' to reject 'others', in attempt to secure 'our' sovereignty and homogeneity. It will then affect one of the main initiatives of the CSME, the free movement of labour. Conditions for free movement have been expanding, by the addition of more occupation categories; however, these conditions are not universal, and this inconsistency results in some chaotic situations amongst member states. In 2009, Prime Minister of St.Vincent, Gonsalves, accused Barbados, which is notorious for its harsh treatments of Caribbean immigrants and tourists, that his nationals as well as Jamaicans, Guyanese and Antiguan have been subject to unfair and discriminatory treatment by Barbadian immigration officers, and he also hinted that if this continues, St.Vincent might withdraw from the CSME^[96]. Such discriminatory treatment includes, according to victims' claims, Jamaicans are subject to body search for illegal drug possession, many Guyanese are denied entry, and Antiguan are targeted

for deportation. In response to the threat made by the Prime Minister of St.Vincent, the Government of Barbados responded that the CSME is not responsible for the illegal influx of foreign residents in Barbados, and there is no wrong doing by putting Barbadians' interests ahead of those of the rest of the CSME member states^[97]. Here, Barbados admitted that they would not treat immigrant labour equal to their own nationals.

As long as there is a socioeconomic development gap between member states, it can be expected that people from less developed states would wish to work in more developed states for better opportunities. A respondent working at a Barbadian ministry, which is responsible for labour, expressed her view:

...I support the initiative of free movement... it is good for the future of the Caribbean... but as a Bajan [Barbadian], personally, I am not necessarily supportive. There are so many unemployed people in tiny Barbados... if the unemployment rate rises, crimes increases, too... if this [immigration flux] continues, Barbados will be like Jamaica... Barbados is very organised and peaceful country with humble good people. It has been that way... I don't think I would wish to work in any other countries in the Caribbean... Jamaica is too dangerous... Guyana is too underdeveloped... Trinidad is... well... there are too many Indians...^[98]

It is noteworthy that the government official of Barbados, the most popular migrant destination amongst the CARICOM states, showed fear that immigrant workers would take away available jobs in her country, and expressed dislike of other member states. Indeed, this xenophobia and its negative impacts were discussed by then Barbados Prime Minister Arthur^[99]. In particular, a more competitive private sector and national economies would be undermined by limiting accessible labour. Once again, this respondent also expressed the sovereignty dilemma, namely she understands the needs and importance of the CSME, yet the sense of sovereignty supported by

her national identity does not allow her to emotionally accept a reality where her native land is flooded with foreign immigrant workers.

Her narrative indicates her discomfort with the Indian population in Trinidad. The Caribbean is considered homogeneously inhabited by Africans; however, roughly half of the population of both Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are descendants of the East Indian migrant works from the colonial era^[100]. For the Barbadian respondent, as her native Barbados has a small Indian population, this Indian component of the total Caribbean population is out of her comfort zone. Other respondents from smaller states, which are predominantly inhabited by Africans, describe their unwillingness to work in Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago, as “Trinidad has the Indian government”^[101], and “Guyana is India in South America”^[102], and they clearly stated they would choose not to work in these countries, because “they are too Indian”^{[103][104]}. On contrary, an Indian Trinidadian respondent expressed no interest in working in “all those black countries”, instead if she could choose, she would migrate to New York or London^[105].

Just like the EU experienced a similar struggle of nationalist attitude and xenophobic concept of culture, when considering a migration policy, ethnicity may also become an issue for the free-movement of labour in the CSME. Nevertheless, to individuals’ liking or not, it is important to utilise all of the skilled labour from the Caribbean market to promote the socioeconomic development of the Caribbean. That is the aim of the CSME.

5.5. Brain-drain

As one of the serious problems facing the Caribbean, the issue of brain-drain, migration of skilled and qualified persons, accelerates the development of more developed states and worsens that of less developed states. In short, it widens the development gap. It affects the availability of technical capacity in all the sectors of the economy in the region. For example, 83% of the total graduates of the University of Guyana migrate within a year of graduation due to unavailability of suitable employment opportunities^[106]. According to the

Immigration Department of the Guyana Police Force, 225,132 persons departed Guyana in 2010, and between 2004 and 2010 departures exceeded 200,000 each year, and their migrant destinations are mostly to the United States, Canada, the UK and the Caribbean islands, mostly Barbados, Antigua and Trinidad^[107]. As a result of brain-drain, Guyana has been suffering from a lack of skilled labour, which is essential to development of the country. Thus brain-drain also contributes to the imbalance in the technical capacity of the member states.

A Dominican respondent working in St. Kitts, expressed her view that brain-drain within the Caribbean is “not necessarily bad, because it assists in the development of the Caribbean”, however, the external brain-drain, where qualified nationals go outside of the Caribbean, is concerning, because it only produces remittances from these migrants, the amount of which is used to support the lives of families back home^[108].

Furthermore, there are skilled Caribbean nationals who obtained degrees in North America and Europe and wish to work in the Caribbean. A great number of them have to leave the Caribbean to seek employment outside the Caribbean, or remain unemployed in the Caribbean^[109]. To make the most of what the Caribbean has, it is essential to review the productivity of the labour market in the CSME. At the same time, it is important to create employment opportunity for those with ‘brains’.

A respondent, who is a Jamaican business consultant based in Canada, indicates that although there are many foreign experts, engineers, medical doctors filling positions in the Caribbean, where it is claimed that there is no available labour, the Caribbean could be self-sustained^[110]. There are so many members of the diaspora living abroad as experts, engineers and doctors, and also there are so many younger Caribbean individuals who are educated abroad and ready to be employed in the Caribbean. A Guyanese lawyer in the UK suggests improving the working and living conditions in the Caribbean, in order to attract members of the diaspora to come back home^[111]. Nevertheless, he showed his reluctance to return to the Caribbean permanently. His claim, which

is echoed by other respondents and academics, that there must be good incentives to promote return migration, such as duty free concessions, which should be attractive enough to offset against the disadvantage of life in the Caribbean, including crime, ineffective public services, lower wages, and less-advanced life infrastructure^{[112][113]}.

5.6. Conclusion

Presently, it is of interest to uncover why the implementation of the CSME has been postponed for years. This is especially the case when the obstacles are argued over, how the obstacles have developed and what is behind the obstacles. This section explored how the lack of political will from each CSME member state, distinct Caribbean sovereignty, national interests, nationalism and xenophobia, and brain-drain are interwoven to affect the implementation of the decisions agreed by the Heads of CARICOM states.

Research findings suggest that the political will is affected by national interests, which is valued more, and consist of national interests. Therefore, the regional interest of the CSME is not given priority over national interests. When national interests are concerned more with sovereignty as an entitlement of a single sovereign state, rather than as a part of the region, the implementation of the CSME is paid less attention. This is especially because elements of the CSME require member states to give up a certain level of sovereignty. In light of losing sovereignty, it is natural for a sovereign state to try to protect its own country and eliminate other elements of other countries as threats.

Yet, excess nationalism and xenophobia will decrease the pace of the implementation of the CSME. Further, as the region continues to suffer from brain-drain, in order to energise the labour market of the region, it is important to assess how destructive brain-drain is in the region. There is enough qualified and skilled Caribbean labour inside and outside the Caribbean to make the CSME self-sufficient. In order to achieve full implementation of the CSME, coordination and arrangements to accept regional immigrants, as well as return migrants, throughout the CSME member states, are necessary.

6. Analysis 2: Suggestions and Prospects for the CSME

6.1. Introduction

As seen in the previous section, the reasons behind the delay include a variety of factors. Examining the discourse on the CSME, as the incomplete economic integration of the small developing states, suggests what needs to be done to promote its implementation. This section examines the perspectives of the CSME stakeholders in relation to suggestions and prospects for the CSME.

6.2. Public Education

One of the initiatives of the CSME, the 'free-movement of labour', has been well-received by the people in the CSME member states. Yet, deep knowledge about the CSME has not been thoroughly circulated. For many Caribbean people, CARICOM means little, and they are not aware of its integration initiatives. A respondent, who is from a small island state, and now at the CARICOM Secretariat for five years, claims she heard of the CSME, but she did not know the details of the CSME, including the free movement of labour, until she started working at the CARICOM Secretariat^[114]. Also, some respondents suggested a regional public awareness campaign^{[115][116]}. There is no doubt that information distribution, and the promotion of free movement of labour at the grass root level, are not promoted effectively.

In light of this, this study argues that one of the reasons the CSME, especially the free movement of labour, has not yet been successfully implemented, is because this initiative has ignored the role and opinion of the public. Indeed, public perception about the CSME would affect its success. Research findings of the study reveal that there is an apparent distrust and uncertainty of the free movement of labour among people^[117]. For example, those respondents, who support the CSME, comment that the free movement of labour is a threat to their countries^{[118][119]}, without recognising they also have the same right to go to other islands to work, if certified.

The failure of education on the fundamental

principle of the CSME, and “the nature and cultural infrastructure of the integration movement”^[120] has been pointed out by academics and politicians^[121]. A senior government official of a bigger member state admits that although not a lot has been done for public education, there is a perceived reluctance or no interest in it. According to him, public education will not necessarily ease people’s national interest to protect their labour market, especially when their economy is not going well^[122]. He continues that smaller member states (in his word “they”) are the ones who need to know about free movement of labour, and who are entitled to travel freely, as his country is “fed up with illegal immigrants”, who are not qualified for the free movement initiative^[123]. This study nevertheless argues that if people are properly informed of the CSME and its benefits, especially of the free movement of labour, they would not fear foreign workers, and they would be more supportive of the initiative. As the labour market becomes more integrated, people will realise the real benefit of the free movement of labour. Moreover, regional governments should train immigration officials to ensure that they rigorously and consistently observe the policies, arrangements and protocols. Additionally, a support mechanism should be established to deal with issues related to unfair and discriminatory treatment received by CSME nationals. Further, related to this, an observing office for immigration issues should be established.

6.3. Technical Issues and Disciplinary Measures

Although the pace has been slow since the beginning, there is no doubt that the CSME is moving forward. One respondent, a regional investment manager, shared his view of the achievement of the CSME:

...what we have to know is the CSME is not a magic. It is just framework... Member states have to work on all the necessary initiatives to support the CSME to get something going... unfortunately, the officials of the member states are not experts of the initiatives...^[124].

This respondent notes that the CSME member

states do not know how to execute the decisions. A senior government official describes how the government treats non-binding decisions:

...a small nation like us is run by small number of officials... our Prime Minister brings back the decisions from the conference, with no instructions, directions or whatsoever is attached, and says this is what we have to do... with no direction, and no deadline is set... what do you expect us to do? None of us are technically trained... I have to say all the decisions were made without consultation of technical experts...^[125].

As far as this study follows the published literature, it does not disclose how the decisions are made by the heads of government, and how they are treated and processed by each government. The very interesting narrative shared by the senior government official showed confusion that is caused by a technical capacity gap.

The decisions regarding the CSME initiatives need to be accompanied by technical instructions for how to prepare for the implementation of the initiative. For example, at the national level, the coordination of understanding, political will, and technical capacity are essential to start working on the decisions made at the Heads of Government meetings. Regarding the free movement of labour, the governments should ensure that existing agreed categories for free movement of skilled labour work efficiently and smoothly in all member states without exception. In order to achieve this consistency among the member states, instructions and directions from CARICOM, or a proposed technical support authority, should be arranged. As some respondents showed their unwillingness and no interest to be part of initiative, and for those countries that do not follow the instruction, enforcement measures should be arranged accordingly.

6.4. Validity and Feasibility

The purpose of the CSME is understood to benefit the people of the community by providing more and better opportunities for integrated production and to

expand exports, and in turn it will improve standards of living and work, and promote sustainable economic development. In light of this, economic integration needs to be prioritised in order to benefit the member states. In order for all the member states, which are varied in the levels of economic development and types of economies, to be ready for integration, regional development strategic plans, in the fields of agro-production, food security, maritime transport and renewable energy production, should be promoted by immediate action plans. As those strategies become technical, a partnership between public and private sectors should be established. Respondents from the private sector all agreed that not only the member governments, but also the CARICOM Secretariat, do not have enough technical experts in quantity and quality, and the private sector is willing to assist CARICOM to build a better economic environment, if CARICOM does not put off its mandates [126][127][128][129][130]. To attract the private sector for this initiative, professional and technical experts should be highly recognised and respected for the suggestions and ideas shared by them. In addition, development assistance from donor countries should be used strategically to promote exports and investments.

Some of the respondents, who are government officials and businesspersons, question the validity of the CSME, and even CARICOM^{[131][132]}. One of them, a senior economist of a member government describes the reason:

...CSME is important, but I don't necessary support the CSME as a complete integration body or CARICOM, because it is just an ineffective gathering of former colonies...it is important as a step, but it is not important as it is... If you think of sizes of their economy, you know it is not feasible and sustainable to collect small island states and claim an economic union... [133].

Being a senior economist, his responsibility is to push his government to be prepared for the implementation of the CSME. It is a relief to see that even though he is not supportive of the CSME, he

admits that it is important "as a step" with a view that it will not remain as an Anglophone Caribbean integration unit. Instead, he expresses his view that it has to be integrated into a larger union in the future.

6.5. Future of CARICOM and the CSME

To become a larger union, such as CARIFORUM (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic), which was established as a regional grouping to negotiate an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union, other countries need to be invited to join. As of July 2015, French Caribbean territories, such as Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana are in discussion to become Associate Members of the CARICOM and/or CARIFORUM. Apart from the French territories, Curacao and Sint Maarten, both former Netherlands Antilles, have also applied for Associate Membership. All of those applications have been under consideration.

Although CARICOM has accepted non-Anglophone Caribbean states as members, such as Haiti and Suriname, its attitude towards the Spanish-speaking Dominican Republic has not been favourable and unconditional. A project officer at CARICOM Secretariat says:

...the CSME will not include the Dominican Republic for sure... They are not part of us. They will never be part of us... They are not even the Caribbean... [134].

Supporting her view, another CARICOM senior official indicates:

...DR [the Dominican Republic] is different from us. It is not hatred, but this feeling of rejection for DR comes from somewhere... They are just part of us only for a trade talk to the EU... it's just because DR has a bigger economy... that's all... [135]

When both of the respondents talked about Haiti, Suriname and Cuba, they did not show this level of rejection. One of the respondents whose father is from the Dominican Republic states:

...I think CARICOM is just jealous about the success that the DR achieved...for CARICOM, the CSME is a group of vulnerable states. They don't want to have strong members... DR is not that big, actually, but it is big for the CSME...and for the members. DR is too big for them...^[136]

Her claim that CARICOM does not want to include the Dominican Republic is empirically supported. Given the fact that the Dominican Republic first expressed their interest to be part of CARICOM in 1989, and did so several times later, CARICOM has not accepted the populous country of 10 million, with an economy double the size of that of the biggest CSME member state, Trinidad and Tobago.

Another respondent whose husband's brother was married to a Dominican Republic citizen shares an interesting experience:

...My sister-in-law sounded so horrible one day by saying how white DR [the Dominican Republic] is and because of that... how better they are... she said... "we are far better than the CARICOM countries... we are far more sophisticated than any of the Caribbean countries that have predominant population of former African slaves..." ... I could not believe those words came out of someone whom I presumably know well..., and you know, she continued saying "DR can lead CARICOM just like in colonial days...just like a slave master"... I was just left speechless...^[137]

Looking at this discourse, it may not be all wrong to say that CARICOM is emotionally attached and bonded to colonial nostalgia; therefore, they are not willing to include the Dominican Republic, as it does not share the same historical and cultural context as the West Indies. In the same way, the Dominican Republic may not wish to be part of CARICOM whose member states have a large component of population of African slave descendants. Nevertheless, the annual Heads of Government meeting in July 2013, which was chaired

by the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, approved irregular observer participants from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The press release from the CARICOM indicates that all the Heads of Government agreed to proceed and accelerate the CSME integration process through urgent institutional and structural reform^[138]. In this context, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago suggested the 'closer embrace' of the Dominican Republic, the Dutch and French Caribbean islands into CARICOM. It is not clear whether this comment was echoed by other regional heads, and whether accepting those countries equals to letting them join the CSME; however, mentioning the possibility of accepting them as non-traditional CARICOM members is a significant step for CARICOM to become a larger entity.

The ambivalent sisterhood with the Dominican Republic may have come to an end. After the Dominican Republic started implementing the controversial ruling by Constitutional Court on 23 September 2013, which is backdated to 1929, that practically deprives people of foreign descent (most of which are of Haitian origin) of Dominican Republican nationality^[139]. Soon after the ruling became public, CARICOM issued a press release to condemn this ruling. Further, the communique issued after the 35th regular Heads of Government meeting in July 2014 clearly states "it would not be business as usual in the Community's relationship with the Dominican Republic"^[140]. Furthermore, an interpretation of this situation could be that white Dominican Republic wants to get rid of their population of black African Haitian descendants, if a theory of colonial race relations in the Caribbean, which sees whites as superior and suppressors of blacks who are considered as inferior and low-class, is applied. A senior government official says:

...Even if they [citizens of the Dominican Republic] stop lynching and sending people to Haiti, CARICOM will not truly accept DR as part of us... there is a thick tall wall between us... you know... please do not laugh at me... I may be paranoid, but... colour plays a very important role in the context of CARICOM-DR

relationship... DR is white and we are black... the situation... maltreatment of people of Haitian heritage in DR... is like... white slave owner is... lynching black slaves for whatever the reason they make up... you know... it was something happening back in old days... how we look at white men is not straightforward... I feel they are always looking down on us... fooling us...^[141]

This is an honest and strong comment from someone who occupies a very high seat in the government of a CARICOM member state. Discussing “race” relations in the Caribbean is beyond a scope of this work; however, it is interesting to see a senior government official admit that he is not comfortable dealing with a “white” counterpart in the region, because it reminds him of a slave system in the colonial days, of which he has never experienced personally. Interestingly, echoed by his statement, the more inhumane treatment to Dominican Republic nationals of Haitian descent by the Dominican Republic authority and people are reported in the news, the more CARICOM tries to settle the situation and seek the attention of the EU, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of American States, and the UN ^[142]. At the time of writing, no official response to this matter from Dominican Republic has been released.

Even if CARICOM is an emotionally attached nostalgic integration entity, to survive in the globalised world, it needs to present itself as an integrated economic union in the form of the CSME. There are other integration movements in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA), and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). It is not surprising that all of the regional unions have conflicting interests, with some of CARICOM member states, such as those in the fields of energy and agriculture. For instance, the principle of ALBA is based on free trade and neoliberal principles with its founding countries: Cuba and Venezuela. It consists of eleven member states, including six CARICOM member states; Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, St. Lucia, Grenada, with other two

CARICOM member states Suriname and Haiti are on the process of joining. What ALBA offers is more attractive than what the inefficient CSME can afford to provide. Namely, its bilateral cooperation programme between its founding countries and member states includes the provision of medical professionals, scholarships for medical students, and most of all, the Petrocaribe initiative, established in 2005, which allows membership outside ALBA, and provides credit to offset part of the cost of oil purchased from Venezuela^[143].

For oil producing Trinidad and Tobago, the Petrocaribe is disruptive to the CSME, as it attempts to utilise its natural resources for political purposes in the context of the CSME^[144]. Moreover, it suppresses Trinidad and Tobago’s exports to CARICOM market, and reduces the feasibility of the proposed Caribbean Gas pipeline from Trinidad to Eastern Caribbean Countries. There are some voices which have accused those countries of betraying CARICOM^[145]. Yet, all the economically small countries are struggling to survive. Some respondents from the small island countries commented that they have tried and waited to get oil within the arrangement of the CSME, but were not successful, because Trinidad and Tobago did not offer as it was promised^[146]. Then, they decided to “go outside and look for other options”^[147]. Judging from their comments, the framework of the CSME affords its first priority, but because it is not functioning as it should be, other options are considered.

Currently, twelve out of fifteen CARICOM members (excluding Barbados, Montserrat and Trinidad and Tobago) have joined Petrocaribe, and it has become one of the biggest financing mechanisms for the Caribbean countries, exceeding the development assistance from the EU, USAID, the IDB and the World Bank^[148]. In June 2013, the Petrocaribe announced, at the end of the summit, that the member states agreed to establish the Petrocaribe Economy Zone for deeper cooperation. While all the member states of the Petrocaribe enjoy their preferential access to Venezuelan oil, the amount of debt that the member countries owe to the Petrocaribe has increased drastically. In August 2013, without any consultation, the member states were shocked with the sudden

introduction of the Petrocaribe's decision for contemplating a 100 per cent increase on interest payable on oil purchased by member countries. The future of Petrocaribe is unclear, especially because no matter how favourably the economic situation is in the member state appear, those in Petrocaribe can in no way afford to repay the debts owed.

6.6. Conclusion

As seen above, this section concludes that what the CARICOM countries need to pursue is a fundamental reformation of their respective economies through re-energizing and promoting the CSME. In order to achieve promotion, firstly the public needs to be informed and educated toward having a favourable attitude towards the CSME. Secondly, CARICOM should appoint a group of technical experts with a mandate to negotiate and oversee the reform of CARICOM/CSME governance in its legal and administrative aspects, in accordance with a clearly-defined and results-oriented timetable. Also, technical support should be provided by the group to the member states, to implement decisions in a collaborative effort between private and public sectors. Thirdly, CARICOM should create a legal basis for the implementation of decisions by the heads of governments, especially in the field of Common Market/Free Trade Area and external trade policy. Most of all, CARICOM should observe and direct the implementation speed of each member state, and if necessary, the disciplinary measures to be applied. CARICOM now stands at a crossroad. If CARICOM does not push member states to complete the economic integration process, the CSME as a Caribbean economic integration union will soon collapse. If the CSME collapses, it will affect the credibility of CARICOM, and in the end, it will affect the existence of CARICOM.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this study was to determine what has prevented the smooth establishment of the CSME, and what procedures need to be administered for an acceleration of the integration process. Although the

lack of generalisation is a limitation of an explanatory study, this research has produced valuable findings to enrich our knowledge of the political realities of the CARICOM and the CSME.

In-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted with respondents in the methodological framework of symbolic interactionism, which enabled the research to examine how individuals responded to their interaction with the researcher. In this process, individuals tend to narrate more about their surroundings to describe and interpret themselves, and this narration provides rich discourse to analyse the surroundings. This study believes that valuable particulars regarding the interests of this study will be found exclusively. This study expects that unpublished facts will be revealed by the research participants, who hold responsibility for policy-making for the governments and/or CARICOM, and who occupy the appointments to work under direct impacts of the operations and the consequences of the CSME.

The research findings suggest that the political will to accelerate the process to complete the establishment of the CSME is affected by the national interests of each member state, which are informed by internal politics. Most of the time, as internal politics is valued more than national interest, when national interests apply more to sovereignty as a single state, instead of as a part of the region, the implementation of the CSME is afforded less attention; thus, the pace of the implementation of the CSME remains slow.

In order for the CSME to pursue its objectives, the member states are required to surrender some degree of their sovereignty to mandate the CARICOM to coordinate the political interests of the member states, and represent the member states in pursuing their regional interests in relation to external powers. Notwithstanding its urgent need, most of the member states were newly independent in the 1960s, and their sense of sovereignty remains exceptionally strong against external domination. Even so, as each member state suffers from a lack of natural, financial and human resources, in order for the CARICOM member states to survive in this globalised world, they need to pool the resources and integrate production within the framework of the CSME, in order to increase its

exports. In return, they will benefit from the effects to advance the socioeconomic development of the Caribbean region.

In re-energising the CSME, bottom up support from ordinary people is indispensable. Strategically managed public education campaigns will yield a better appreciation of the advantages and prospects amongst the people, to foster a favourable attitude towards the CSME. Also, technical support initiatives need to be installed to support the reform of CARICOM/CSME governance, in order to speed up the implementation of the decisions made by the heads of government. To achieve this goal, CARICOM should establish a legal entity, mandated to observe and direct the speed of implementation in each member state. If needed, disciplinary measures should be introduced.

To mitigate the impact of globalisation in relation to the external world, CARICOM needs to compel its member states to work on the implementation of the decisions, to complete the full establishment of a functioning CSME. In response to globalisation, other integration initiatives have been introduced by neighbouring countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed some of the CSME member states have joined some of those unions. All of these integration initiatives pursue different political agendas that bring about conflicts of interest between and among the CSME member states, to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, it will weaken and eventually cause the collapse of the CSME. Further, among these initiatives, the CSME is the smallest in economic size and less active in terms of provision of benefits, because it is not functioning properly. This study reiterates that if CARICOM chooses to proceed with its integration initiative, the CSME, stronger direction and instruction will be required to coordinate the political will and technical capacity of the CSME member states. If CARICOM remains unchanged, not only the CSME, but CARICOM too, will collapse in the near future, due to loss of its credibility. In that case, what will remain unchanged, will be the fact that member states will still try to achieve their respective political national interests as sovereign state, in spite of their small economic size and inadequate

macroeconomic governance.

In July 2013, for the first time in CARICOM's history, a premier of the member state, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, suggested extending invitations to non-West Indian Caribbean countries, specifically Dominican Republic, the Dutch and French Caribbean islands, to join CARICOM at the Heads of the CARICOM meeting. Although it is not clear whether this suggestion was supported by other heads of government, and whether this invitation to CARICOM includes participation to the CSME, as of August 2015, the Dominican Republic has applied for full membership, and French territories in the Caribbean: Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana, and the former Netherlands Antilles: Curacao and Sint Maaten, are seeking to join CARICOM as Associate Member States. If this happens, it would definitely provoke changes to the power relations among the CARICOM countries. This is especially the case when recognising the economic giant Dominican Republic, which boasts an economy, 2.2 times bigger than that of the CSME's biggest, Trinidad and Tobago. The new collaboration will produce more than double of the economy, yet politics within the CSME may not allow further integration within the common market, especially in the field of free movement of labour. In any case, like it or not, CARICOM needs to make up its mind to move forward through political coordination of the member states, or it will remain a union to provide almost nothing.

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Abstract (Japanese)

本稿は、カリブ海における地域統合体「カリコム」の更なる地域経済政治統合の動きである「カリコム単一市場経済（CSME）」について、その完成を妨げている様々な要因の理論的背景を先駆的に探求したものである。カリコム加盟国15ヶ国における天然資源や人的資源の不足、また弱小且つ脆弱な経済がもたらす様々な問題を解決し、統合を達成しようとする政治意思や強いリーダーシップが、なぜ域内において欠如しているのかを探り、理解を推し進めるものである。ガイアナ、トリニダード・トバゴ、ジャマイカ、バルバドス等のカリブ海諸国や、ニューヨークやマイアミにおいて、44人のカリブ諸国政府高官やビジネス関係者等カリブ海地域出身のカリコム関係者に対し、対面及びビデオ・スカイプによるインタビューを行い、談話分析を行った。調査結果によると、ナショナリズムに影響を受けた人的資源不足に悩むCSME参加国が、CSMEにおける主権争いや利害衝突を引き起こし、結果としてカリコムを形骸化させ政治意思を実現不可能にしていることが明らかになった。しかしながら、グローバル化が進む世界の中、カリコム諸国が生き残るためにCSME達成が最重要であることはCSME参加国間で強い合意に達している。そのため今後必要となるのは、CSME達成に向けた各国に対する技術支援を迅速に行うため、カリコムとCSMEのガバナンスを根底から改善することである。

キーワード：カリブ海地域統合，カリコム，小島嶼開発途上国，カリコム単一市場経済，談話分析



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専門は旧英領カリブ海地域におけるポストコロニアル社会の政治・経済，社会経済開発，社会問題。在トリニダード・トバゴ日本国大使館専門調査員や駐ガイアナ国連機関プログラム・オフィサー等として，ジャマイカ，トリニダード・トバゴ，ガイアナ，バルバドス等，カリブ海地域での延べ10年間に亘る駐在中に見聞した問題を中心に研究している。